Ideas from 'Analyzing Modality' by Michael Jubien [2007], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics vol.3' (ed/tr Zimmerman,Dean W.) [OUP 2007,978-0-19-921839-4]].
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
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11115
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'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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11116
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Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
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11117
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Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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11119
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De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
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11118
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Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
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11108
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Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
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11111
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Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
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11109
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If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
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11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
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11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
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11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
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11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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11110
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We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
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